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Abstract 
Model checking is a proven successful technology for verifying hardware. It works, however, 
on only finite state machines, and most software systems have infinitely many states. Our ap- 
proach to applying model checking to software hinges on identifying appropriate abstractions 
that exploit the nature of both the system, S, and the property, 4, to be verified. We check $J 
on an abstracted, but finite, model of S. 
Following this approach we verified three cache coherence protocols used in distributed file 
systems. These protocols have to satisfy this property: “If a client believes that a cached file 
is valid then the authorized server believes that the client’s copy is valid.” In our finite model 
of the system, we need only represent the “beliefs” that a client and a server have about a 
cached file; we can abstract from the caches, the files’ contents, and even the files themselves. 
Moreover, by successive application of the generalization rule from predicate logic, we need 
only consider a model with at most two clients, one server, and one file. We used McMillan’s 
SMV model checker; on our most complicated protocol, SMV took less than 1 s to check over 
43 600 reachable states. 0 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Motivation: theorem proving and model checking 
Software systems keep growing in size and complexity. Many large, complex soft- 
ware systems must guarantee certain critical functional, real-time, fault-tolerant, and 
performance properties. Proving that such a system satisfies these kinds of properties 
can increase our confidence that it will operate correctly and reliably. Proofs based on 
formal, rather than informal, techniques make our reasoning precise; moreover, they 
are amenable to mechanical aids such as syntax and semantics checkers. 
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Formal reasoning entails comparing two formal objects, e.g., establishing the cor- 
rectness of a program with respect to a specification or showing that one concurrent 
process simulates another. The starting point is having two formal objects. There are 
two general approaches to showing the correspondence between these two objects: the- 
orem proving and model checking. We argue that model checking should and will play 
a larger role in reasoning about software systems than it does today. 
The traditional approach to formal reasoning about software is program verification 
where one formal object is the program text and the other is a specijication written in 
some mathematical ogic. The formal technique used to show a correspondence between 
the two objects is based on theorem proving. Over time this approach has been shown 
to work on increasingly larger and larger programs, especially as the tool support like 
theorem provers and proof checkers has become more and more sophisticated. Yet, it 
still has drawbacks: 
a The size of a program we can prove correct is on the order of only a couple thousand 
lines of code [14]. 
l To do such a proof requires highly-skilled people, such as theorem-proving experts, 
domain experts, or both. 
l The human time to do such a proof is on the order of months or even years; the 
machine time, on the order of hours [14]. 
l In the course of such a proof, we are often forced to prove “obvious” or “uninter- 
esting” theorems; the amount of effort to prove them is often the same as that for 
proving the “essential” property of interest. 
We believe that there is a time and place for program verification, e.g., for key com- 
ponents of a safety-critical system. In this paper, however, we directly address the 
concerns of the vast majority of the software engineering community, which questions 
whether the cost in time, effort, and resources for program verification is worth the 
eventual benefit gained. 
We suggest a radically different tack: model checking. The two formal objects com- 
pared are a jnite state machine model of the software system, and as before, a spec- 
ification written in some mathematical logic. 
Model checking is a proven successful verification technology in the hardware com- 
munity. For example, it has been used to find bugs in published circuits [5,16], the 
cache coherence protocol for the Encore Gigamax multiprocessor [32], the IEEE Fu- 
turebus+ Standard [lo], and telephone switching systems [ 181. It has been used to 
prove safety and liveness properties of the T9000 virtual channel processor [4]. 
Fundamental to model checking is its reliance on$nite state machines. Model check- 
ing exploits this finiteness property by performing an exhaustive case analysis of the 
machine’s set of states. Recent technological advances have greatly improved the ability 
to apply this technique to real systems: model checkers can now check systems on the 
order of 10zo states, and for some systems this number can be as large as 10i300 [ll]. 
The rationale behind why theorem proving has been the primary approach for rea- 
soning about software is that software systems are, in general, infinite state machines. 
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We thus rely on induction to prove in a finite number of steps a property over infinite 
domains. Model checking, at first glance, seems inappropriate. 
There are three methodological reasons for why model checking is appropriate. First, 
the inductive arguments used in proof work well for highly structured components 
(e.g., generic data types like sets and mappings), but fail at the system level, because 
of discontinuities in value spaces and irregularities in software structure. We are forced 
to resort to huge case analyses anyway, perhaps with inductive proofs performed only 
locally. Thus, though it may seem restrictive to use model checking because we cannot 
prove something about all possible values drawn from an infinite domain, it is exactly 
the kind of technology needed to handle the huge case analyses at the system level. 
Second, checking a model of the system rather than the system itself raises the level 
of abstraction at which we do our formal reasoning. Though, we may fall short of 
doing “exact” reasoning about the original system, we can more quickly, with less 
effort, and completely automatically do “approximate” reasoning. (An argument must 
be made, of course, that the model checked is not so abstract that it trivially satisfies 
the property of interest.) 
Third, as the hardware community has discovered, model checking has been tremen- 
dously successful at finding bugs in hardware designs. It is more common to find that a 
system has errors than that it is correct. The same is true, if not more so, for software. 
Thus, model checking can help software designers find bugs in their designs, where a 
design is a natural abstraction of the actual working system. Moreover, if the goal of 
formal reasoning is to find bugs, then it matters less that we do only “approximate,” 
rather than “exact,” reasoning. 
Thus, though theorem proving has its place, e.g., for doing inductive arguments 
and low-level program verification, model checking can complement theorem proving 
efforts. It is worth exploring all avenues as to how. 
The target audience of this paper are people who build large, complex software 
systems for their livelihood. With this case study, we intend to alert them that a 
technology that they might have shied away from before because of its limitations is 
worth serious consideration because of its outweighing benefits. Thus, our audience is 
not the model checking community who already know about the power and usefulness 
of model checking, but the software engineering community. We see our role in the 
formal methods community to effect this transfer of technology. 
We present the gist of our approach in Section 2. Then in Section 3 we give back- 
ground information to our case study - our application domain and the cache coherence 
problem; and a brief description of the model checker that we used, SMV, and its in- 
put specification language, CTL. We give details of the case study in Section 4; we 
used SMV to verify three cache coherence protocols for distributed file systems: two 
implemented for the Andrew File System (AFS) and one for the Coda File System. 
In Section 5, we use the case study to illustrate how we followed our approach; we 
explain different kinds of specific abstractions that software engineers can in general 
apply to their systems to produce finite state machine models. We discuss related work 
in Section 6 and close with conclusions and future work in Section 7. 
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2. Our approach: finding good abstractions 
The successes in reasoning about hardware systems raise the obvious question: How 
can model checking be applied to reasoning about software systems? In this paper, 
we elaborate on this answer: 
Approach: Model check a finite state machine abstraction of a software system. 
This approach (see Fig. 1) relies on finding abstraction mappings, A, to apply to a 
software system (possibly an infinite state machine), S, and then subjecting the abstract 
model (a finite machine), M, to a model checker. We use a model checker as a black 
box to check M against the specification, 4. The model checker outputs either true, if 
M satisfies I$, or a counterexample, if it does not. 
Key to our approach is to exploit the nature of C$ to determine what abstractions are 
reasonable to define and apply. Based on our case study, we broadly classify the ones 
we identified as follows (elaborated on in Section 5): 
Exploiting the form of 4. In our example, because of the form of our correctness 
condition, we use the generalization rule of first-order logic to justify that checking 
a finite case suffices to show that C$ holds for the infinite case. 
Exploiting domain-specijc knowledge. In our distributed systems domain, we col- 
lapse distinct failures like crashed nodes and links into a single type of failure. 
Also, we place a bound on transmission delay, and furthermore model it as a sin- 
gle step taken by the system’s environment. Both abstractions are reasonable since 
implementors of distributed systems make similar simplifications. 
Exploiting problem-specific knowledge. $I might express an abstract property about 
an object, not its value. For example, suppose 4 is a property about the size of a 
bounded integer set; we do not care about the value of the set itself. If the bound 
is small, we can model each possible size. 
The first kind of abstraction can be applied to any problem or domain. The second 
can be applied when considering any problem for distributed systems since failures 
-* trueor 
counterexample 
Abstractions A 
Fig. 1. Model checking so&vare. 
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and timing behavior cannot be completely ignored in those systems. The third class 
of abstractions, though particularly appropriate for our case study, are just examples 
of abstractions that are generally applicable to other problems. All can be viewed as 
software design rules (“-of-thumb”) that when applied raise the level at which we can 
think about the essence of a software system. 
3. Case study: cache coherence protocols for distributed file systems 
In a distributed file system, servers store files; clients store local copies of these 
files in their caches. Caching increases performance at the client when connectivity and 
bandwidth are low, and increases availability and reliability when temporary failures 
occur. Clients communicate with servers by exchanging messages and data (e.g., files). 
Clients do not communicate with each other. Each file is associated with exactly one 
designated “home” or authorized server. 
A problem arises when there are several copies of a file in a system. A file is 
valid if it is the most recent copy in the system. Recency is typically determined by 
a timestamp associated with the file. If a client updates its copy and it is the most 
recent update in the system, then all other copies of that file become invalid. The goal 
of a cache coherence protocol is to make sure a client performs work on only files it 
believes are valid. 
There are two ways to ensure cache coherence. Either the client asks the server 
whether its copy is valid (validation-based) or the server tells the client when the 
client’s copy is no longer valid (invalidation-based). 
Cache coherence in a distributed system is more difficult to achieve than on a multi- 
processor because of the presence of failures and transmission delay. Thus, since global 
knowledge is impossible to achieve in a distributed system [21], we settle for pairwise 
knowledge between clients and servers. Our notion of belief captures this pairwise 
knowledge [34]. 
An invariant property to prove of all cache coherence protocols is that if a client 
believes that a cached file is valid, then the server that is the authority on the file 
believes the client’s copy is valid. More formally, 
CC : Q C : client . if S : server . kf f : file. 
C believes valid(fc) + S believes valid( fc) 
where fo stands for the copy of f at C [34]. 
A validation-based technique, AFS-1, was used in the Andrew File System from 
19841985 [38]; for performance reasons, an invalidation-based technique, AFS-2, re- 
placed AFS-1 and has been in use in Andrew since 1985 [24]. In 1993 Mummert, as 
part of her Ph.D. thesis work, started implementing a more complicated invalidation- 
based cache coherence protocol [33], similar to AFS-2, as a variation for the Coda 
Distributed File System [37]. We call Mummert’s extension to Coda’s protocol Coda+. 
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It was this work that inspired our initial investigation of this case study since Mum- 
mert wanted a way to prove formally that her protocol design was correct. Inspired by 
the logic of authentication [6], Mummer? et al. [34] formalized the notions of belief 
and validity, as used above, and applied the extended logic to reason about cache co- 
herence for AFS-1, AFS-2, and Mummert’s variation of Coda’s protocol. The actual 
proofs were done by hand. We observed, however, that the state machine models for 
all protocols described in [34] are finite and small - trivial for a model checker. So to 
complete the formal analysis, we subjected all three protocols to model checking. 
Before we present the details of the examples, we need to give some background 
information. We start with an informal description of our system model for reasoning 
about cache coherence based on the notion of belief. Assumptions made for our model 
are common to all three protocols we analyzed. The system model and assumptions 
are taken directly from Mummert et al’s work in [34]. We then give a brief high-level 
description of SMV and CTL. 
3.1. System model and assumptions 
We designate hosts as clients or servers of the file system. Clients and servers 
communicate by sending messages to each other via remote procedure call; each request 
made by one party requires a response from the other. 
Clients speak only to servers, not to other clients. We assume the underlying com- 
munication protocol addresses end-to-end concerns such as guaranteeing authenticity 
and eliminating duplicate messages. 
Exactly one repository, which could be one server or a group of servers, is the 
authority for each file system object. In this paper, we use the generic term “server” 
for a repository. A file system object is any data contained by a server that may be 
cached at a client, including files, portions of files, file attributes, or version numbers. 
For now, it suffices to think of these objects as files; later in Section 4.3 they may 
also be version numbers. 
The local state of a client, C, includes a set of cached data, C.D, and a set of beliefs, 
CB, about objects in its cache. The local state of a server, S, includes a set of data 
objects, S.D, for which it is considered the authority, and for each client C, a set of 
beliefs, &.B, that includes which objects are present in C’s cache and their validity. 
The global state of the system is a tuple of all clients’ and servers’ local states, plus 
an agreement set Acs, which determines for each data object d whose authority is S and 
is cached at C, whether the server and client copies are equal. State transitions occur 
when a component of the global state changes. The agreement set is the state variable 
used to approximate global knowledge about the validity of all files. It represents 
pairwise knowledge, which is attained between connected pairs of clients and servers. 
We reason about the presence or absence of file system objects cached at clients 
and their validity. An object is valid if it is the most recent copy in the system. 
Otherwise, it is invalid. Recency is determined by a timestamp associated with the file. 
The timestamp is replaced whenever the file is updated. 
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Since servers may not hear about updates immediately, validity is global knowledge 
and cannot always be determined. However, if C and S agree on an object, and S 
believes its copy is valid, then C should be able to conclude that its cached copy is 
valid. If S receives an update from a client other than C, then regardless of the global 
validity of the updated copy, S is justified in telling C that its copy of the object is 
now invalid. 
A cache coherence protocol defines a set of possible runs, i.e., message exchanges, 
between clients and servers about objects. Each run begins with an initial message 
and ends with a final message; each protocol has a predefined set of initial and final 
messages. Before a run a client considers all objects in its cache suspect, which means 
that it does not have a belief on their validity. During a run clients and servers gain 
beliefs about cached objects. At the end of the run, they all discard all their beliefs. 
Failures can terminate runs. If failures occur, beliefs are discarded but clients do 
not discard their cached files. After a run, a client must again consider all its cached 
objects suspect because it cannot check if they are valid, nor can the server notify it 
that they are not. Failures are detected by message timeouts. If a message times out, 
the principal that sent the message considers it a final message. However, if a client 
and server both believe a run is in progress, then the run ends once both principals 
detect the failure. 
3.2. SMV and CTL 
Users can describe synchronous or asynchronous finite state machines with the model 
checker SMV [31]. Although for our application domain of distributed systems, it might 
seem more natural to use an asynchronous model, the protocol itself is more easily 
described in terms of a synchronous model. The send of a client’s message corresponds 
to the receipt of that message by the server, and in any run of the protocol, the client 
and server alternate sending messages to each other. Moreover, since the protocol 
relies on timeouts for detecting failures, in fact the actual system can be viewed as 
synchronous [39]. Thus, we need only use SMV’s synchronous modeling capability. 
SMV expects input specifications (4 of Fig. 1) in the form of Computational Tree 
Logic (CTL), a subset of branching time temporal logic. A CTL formula is a boolean 
expression, an existential (E) path formula, a universal (A) path formula, or the applica- 
tion of standard boolean operators to CTL formulae. A path formula is the application 
of the temporal operators next (X), eventually (F), or globally (G), to a CTL formula; 
or the application of until (U) to a pair of CTL formulae. Put simply, in a quantified 
CTL formula the temporal operators always come in pairs of a path quantifier and a 
state quantifier. 
CTL formulae are interpreted with respect to an infinite computation tree derived 
from finite state transition machines. Each path in the tree is a sequence of states. So, 
for example, if P is a boolean expression then AG P is a CTL formula that says “in 
all paths, in all states P holds”, i.e., P is invariant; EF P says “in some path, there is 
some state in which P is true” or more informally, P is potentially true. 
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We explain as needed further details of SMV and CTL in the examples, 
4. The three protocols 
In this section, we present how we used McMillan’s SMV model checker to verify 
the AFS-1, AFS-2, and Coda+ protocols. They are small enough to present in their 
entirety but “big” enough to let us illustrate common abstractions others can apply to 
their own systems. For each example, we discuss the restrictions of the general model 
of Section 3.1 and describe the SMV input and output. 
4.1. AFS-I 
In AFS-1, a client has two initial states: either it has no files or it has one or more 
files but no beliefs about their validity. If the protocol starts with the client having no 
file in its cache, then the client may request a copy from the server and the protocol 
terminates when the file is received. If the protocol starts with the client having suspect 
files, then the client may request a validation for a file from the server. If the file is 
invalid then the client requests a new copy and the run terminates. If the file is valid, 
the protocol simply terminates. 
4.1.1. State machine model 
Without loss of generality, we can analyze this cache coherence protocol by consid- 
ering one client, C, one server, S, and one file, f. Implicitly, the system includes at 
least one other client to represent remote updates. The top graph in Fig. 2 shows the 
state transition graphs for the client, and the bottom, for the server. The nodes are la- 
beled by the value for the state variable, belief; the arcs, by the name of the message 
received that causes the state transition. A run of the protocol begins in an initial state 
(one of the leftmost nodes) and ends in a final state (one of the rightmost nodes). 
The client’s belief about a file ranges over {nofile, valid, invalid, suspect}. 
The client’s belief is nof ile if the client cache is empty; valid, if the client believes 
its cached file is valid; invalid if it believes its cached file is not valid; suspect, if 
it has no belief about the validity of the file (it could be valid or invalid). 
The server’s belief about the file cached by the client ranges over {valid, invalid, 
none}. The server’s belief is valid if the server believes that the file cached at the 
client is valid; invalid, if the server believes it is not valid, none, if the server has 
no belief about the existence of the file in the client’s cache or its validity. 
The set of messages that the client may send to the server is {fetch, validate}. 
The message fetch stands for a request for the file. The validate message is used 
by the client to determine the validity of the file in its cache. 
The set of messages that the server may send to the client is {val, inval}. The 
server sends the val (inval) message to indicate to the client that its cached file is 
valid (invalid). 
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Client 
; 
Server 
fetch 
Fig. 2. State transition graphs for AFS-1. 
There are three classes of runs of this protocol, corresponding to the three paths 
in the client’s state transition diagram: a cache miss, a cache hit with a successful 
validation, and a cache hit with a failed validation. 
4.1.2. Specijkation of cache coherence in CTL 
Given the state variables for a client state machine, Client, and a server state machine, 
Server, we can express CC as the following CTL formula: 
AG ((Client.belief = valid > -+ (Server.belief 
Recall that in CTL AG P says “for all paths, for all states 
“invariably, everywhere P.” 
4.1.3. SMV input for AFS-1 
The SMV input program for AFS-1, shown in Figs. 3 and 
= valid)) 
P” or more informally, 
4, is a textual represen- 
tation of the state transition graphs of Fig. 2. We show it for completeness since the 
transcription of a state transition graph to an SMV program is straightforward. The fifth 
line in Fig. 3 gives the CTL specification against which the state machine is checked. 
To show how SMV finds counterexamples, we add in the sixth line another CTL 
specification for SMV to check, the converse of our correctness condition: 
AG ((Server.belief = valid) + (Client.belief = valid)) 
The SMV input program is composed of the modules main, server, and client. 
The third and fourth lines declare instances of the server and client modules. 
The module server takes a parameter input that can be any message coming from 
the client, indicated by the instantiation of the parameter by Client. out in the fourth 
line. 
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MODULE main -- af sl 
VAR 
Client : client (Server.out); 
Server : server (Client.out); 
SPEC AG ((Client.belief = valid) -> (Server.belief = valid)) 
SPEC AC ((Server.belief = valid) -> (Client.belief = valid)) 
tlODULE server(input) 
VAR 
out : { 0, val, inval }; 
belief : { none, valid,invalid }; 
valid-file : boolean; 
ASSIGN 
valid-file := { 0,l }; 
init (belief) : = none ; 
next (belief) : = 
case 
(belief = none) t (input = fetch) : valid; 
(belief = none) & (input = validate) & valid-file : valid; 
(belief = none) k (input = validate) & !valid-file : invalid; 
(belief = invalid) & (input = fetch) : valid; 
1 : belief; 
esac ; 
init(out) := 0; 
next (out) := 
case 
(belief = none) k (input = fetch) : val; 
(belief = none) & (input = validate) & valid-file : val; 
(belief = none) L (input = validate) & !valid-file : inval; 
(belief = invalid) 8 (input = fetch) : val; 
1 : 0; 
esac ; 
Fig. 3. SMV input program for AFS-I: Main and server modules. 
The SMV init and next functions define the initial value and next-state value for 
a state variable. In SMV a case expression returns the value of the first expression 
on the right hand side of the colon ( : ), such that the corresponding condition on the 
left hand side is true. Cases are evaluated in order. Thus, the fifth case (1: belief) 
in the definition of the next function for the belief variable is the catchall “else” 
case; here it says that belief’s value stays the same if none of the conditions of the 
previous four cases hold, i.e., the server’s belief about the file does not change. 
The server module has two other state variables besides belief. The out variable 
ranges over the messages that the server may send to the client. The 0 message stands 
for no message and is needed to model the initial state; the fifth case (1: 0) in the 
definition of the next function for the out variable says that no message is sent 
if none of the conditions of the previous four cases hold. The valid-file boolean 
variable models the effect of the environment as perceived by the server. It is used 
when the client has a suspect file in its cache and requests a validation from the 
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MODULE client (input) 
VAR 
out : (0. fetch, validate}; 
belief : {valid, invalid, suspect, nofile}; 
ASSIGN 
init (belief 1 := nofile, suspect; 
next (belief) := 
case 
(belief = nofile) t (input = val) : valid; 
(belief = suspect) 
(belief = suspect) 
(belief = invalid) 
1: belief; 
esac ; 
initcout) := 0; 
next (out) := 
case 
& (input = val) : valid; 
t (input = inval) : invalid: 
R (input = val) : valid: 
(belief = nofile) : fetch; 
(belief = invalid) : fetch: 
(belief = suspect) : validate; 
1 : 0; 
esac ; 
Fig. 4. SMV input program for AFS-1: Client module. 
server. We need to model both the possibility that the server has received an update 
by some other client and the possibility that it has not. If an update by some other 
client has occurred then the server reflects that by nondeterministically setting the value 
of valid-file to 0; otherwise, the server sets the value to 1 (the file cached at the 
client is still valid). This nondeterminism is captured in the SMV input program in 
Fig. 3 by the assignment of the set of values { 0,l } to the variable valid-file. 
In the module client, in addition to the state variable belief, as for the server, 
we use the out variable to range over the messages that the client may send to the 
server. 
4.1.4. SMV output for AFS-1 
Fig. 5 shows the output of SMV for AFS-1. 
SMV indicates that (1) the first property, the cache coherence invariant, is true 
and (2) the second property, the converse, is false. SMV produces a counterexample 
indicated by the sequence of three states named 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in the output, where in 
the first state, the initial values of the state variables are given, and in subsequent states, 
the new values of only the changed state variables are given. Thus in the last state 
of the sequence, the second property is false since the value of the server’s belief 
variable is valid but that of the client’s is nof ile. This counterexample corresponds to 
the following scenario. Initially, the client has no file and the server has no beliefs. The 
client then requests a copy from the server. Then, the server receives this fetch request 
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__ specification AG (Client.belief = valid -> Server.beli... is true 
-- specification AG (Server.belief = valid -> Client.beli... is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
state 1.1: 
Client.out = 0 
Client.belief = nofile 
Server.out = 0 
Server.belief = none 
Server. valid-file = 0 
state 1.2: 
Client.out = fetch 
state 1.3: 
Server.out = val 
Server.belief = valid 
resources used: 
user time: 0.133333 s, system time: 0.116667 s 
BDD nodes allocated: 1048 
Bytes allocated: 917504 
BDD nodes representing transition relation: 112 + 1 
reachable states: 26 (2^ 4.70044) out of 216 (2- 7.75489) 
Fig. 5. SMV output for AFS-1. 
and sends a copy to the client, believing, of course, that the file sent and thus cached 
by the client is valid. Thus, the server believes the file is valid, but in this last state, 
the client has not received the server’s message and still believes that it has no file. 
The line after resources used: says that SMV takes fractions of a second to check 
both properties and the last line says that the number of reachable states for AFS-1 is 
26. 
4.2. AFS-2 
The two main differences between AFS-1 and AFS-2 are that (1) AFS-2 maintains 
cache coherence using callbacks [24], and (2) it needs to handle the case of failures. 
When a client caches a file, the server promises that it will notify that client if the file 
changes. This is called a callback promise, or simply callback. If the file changes, the 
server’s invalidation message is called a callback break. 
AFS-2 works as follows. Initially, a client may have one of two beliefs about a file. 
It either believes it has no copy of the file or it has a suspect copy. If the client’s 
initial belief is that it has no file, the client may request a copy from the server. The 
server then has a callback on that file. If the file is ever updated, the server notifies 
the client and the client discards its copy. If the client’s initial belief is that there is 
a suspect file in its cache, the client may request a validation from the server. If the 
file is valid, then the server has a callback on that file. If the file is invalid, the client 
discards its copy. If at any time during a run a failure occurs in the system, the clients 
then consider their copies of the file suspect and the server discards its beliefs about 
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Server 
validate & valid-file = 1 
Fig. 6. State transition graphs for AFS-2. 
the validity of the files cached by the clients. The client does not discard the file, 
because it is cheaper to validate the file when the failure is repaired than to refetch 
it. We assume for simplicity that clients do not discard files for any reason other than 
invalidation. Of course, in practice clients may discard files for other reasons, such as 
lack of space. 
4.2.1. State machine models 
For AFS-2, we also consider a simplified model with just one server, two identical 
clients (Client1 and Client2), and one file. Fig. 6 gives the state transition graphs for 
each client and the server. 
The client’s belief about a file ranges over {valid, suspect, nofile}. The belief 
valid indicates that the file is in cache and it is valid; suspect, that the file is in 
cache but the client has no belief about its validity; nof ile, that there is no file in 
cache. Since a file that is believed to be invalid is immediately discarded by the clients, 
we have chosen not to represent the belief invalid to simplify the system. 
For each client, the server has a belief about the validity of the file cached by that 
client. Each belief ranges over {valid, nocall}, where valid indicates that there is 
a file in the client’s cache and it is valid; nocall, that the server has no callback on 
the file cached by a client. 
The messages that the clients may send to the server are {fetch, validate, update}. 
An update message to the server indicates that the file cached by the client has been 
updated. The server’s messages are the same as for AFS-1. 
There are five classes of runs, corresponding to the five paths shown in the client’s 
state transition diagram: 
l cache miss, no failures, 
l successful validation, no failures, 
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. 
0 
a 
__ specification AC (Clientl.belief = valid -> Server.bel. . . is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
state 1.1: 
Clientl.out = 0 
Clientl.belief = nofile 
Client2.out = 0 
Client2.belief = nof ile 
Server.outl = 0 
Server.out2 = 0 
Server. belief 1 = nocall 
Server.belief2 = nocall 
Server. validFile = 0 
Server. validFile = 0 
Env.failurel = 0 
Env.failure2 = 0 
state 1.2: 
Clientl.out = fetch 
Client2.out = fetch 
state 1.3: 
Server.outl = val 
Server.out2 = val 
Server.belief 1 = valid 
Server.belief2 = valid 
state 1.4: 
Clientl.belief = valid 
ClientZ.belief = valid 
Server.outl = 0 
Server. out2 = 0 
state 1.5: 
Clientl.out = update 
Clientl.out = update 
state 1.6: 
Server.outl = inval 
Server. out2 = inval 
Server .belief 1 = nocall 
Server.belief2 = nocall 
Fig. 7. SMV counterexample for incorrect invariant for AFS-2. 
failed validation, no other failures, 
cache miss followed by failure, 
successful validation followed by failure. 
Recall that at the beginning of each run, the client neither believes its cached state 
is valid, nor believes it invalid. 
4.2.2. SMV input and output for AFS-2 
If we use the same correctness criterion for AFS-2 as we did for AFS-1, SMV 
gives a counterexample shown in Fig. 7. Our “invariant” is not an invariant! The 
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reason is that the cache coherence invariant holds for AFS-2 only within certain timing 
constraints due to transmission delay. Consider the following scenario, indicated by the 
counterexample. Client1 has a valid file in its cache and the server has a callback on 
that file. Client2 suddenly updates its copy of the file. Then the server immediately 
believes that the file cached by Client1 is not valid and sends a message to Client1 
to notify it. In this state, Client1 has not yet received the server’s message and it still 
believes that its file is valid. So there is a period of time due to transmission delay 
during which the invariant does not hold. Let r represent the upper bound on this time 
interval, then the following property is true: 
CC’: If a client believes its file is valid at the present, then before some 
past interval of time of length r, the server believed the file cached by that 
client is valid. 
In CTL, there are operators about the future, not the past, so we reformulate this 
property using its contrapositive. We also model the transmission delay by the amount 
of time it takes to go from one state to another, i.e., a single step. (We justify this 
aspect of our model in Section 5.2.) This leads us to the following CTL formula, which 
is the cache coherence condition (CC’ above) we use for AFS-2: 
AG ((Server.beliefl = nocall) + 
AX ((Clientl.belief = nofile) I (Clientl.belief = suspect>>> 
where AX means “invariably, in the next state.” 
The SMV input for AFS-2 is similar to that for AFS-1, and hence omitted. The 
system consists of the instances Clientl, Client2, Server, and Env. We introduce the 
env module (Fig. 8), representing the environment, so that we can explicitly model 
l4ODULE env 
VAR 
failure1 : boolean; 
failure2 : boolean; 
ASSIGN 
init(failure1) := 0; 
next(failure1) := 
case 
!failurel : { 0,l }; 
1 : 1; 
esac; 
init(failure2) := 0; 
next(failure2) := 
case 
!failure2 : 0,l; 
1 : 1; 
esac ; 
Fig. 8. SMV environment module for AFSZ. 
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failures that occur between Client1 and the Server and between Client2 and the Server. 
The env module has two state variables f ailurel and f ailure2. Each one of them 
can be independently set to 1. Once a variable is set to 1, it remains at that value for 
the rest of the run. 
The server module has two beliefs, belief 1 and belief2. The server module 
in AFS-2 is otherwise similar to the server module in AFS-1. The client module 
is also similar as that for AFS-1. The only difference is that in AFS-2 a client may 
also send an update message to the server when it believes its file is valid. 
When SMV checks that the cache coherence invariant (CC’) is true, it uses a total 
time of less than 0.5 s; the number of reachable states is 7776. 
4.3. Coda+ 
Coda supports server replication, allowing volumes to be stored on a group of servers. 
A volume is a collection of files forming a partial subtree in the file name space [41]. 
A file is contained in exactly one volume. The servers on which a volume is stored 
is called the volume storage group (VSG). At any time, the subset of those servers 
available is called the accessible volume storage group (AVSG). 
The Coda cache coherence protocol is based on the AFS-2 protocol, but with a 
group of servers as a repository. Clients contact all servers in the AVSG (though data 
is shipped from only one), and all servers maintain callbacks for objects cached from 
the VSG. To reason about this protocol, all that is required is a small change to the 
definition of a run, so that it ends when the AVSG changes. This is natural because 
if the AVSG shrinks, there exists the potential for a lost callback from the server that 
disappeared. If the AVSG grows, the additional server may hold updated versions of 
cached data. 
Mummert’s large granularity cache coherence protocol extends the Coda scheme. 
To reduce client-server communication in failure-prone environments, callbacks may 
be maintained on volumes in addition to or instead of files. A callback on a vol- 
ume constitutes proof that all cached files in the volume are valid. To establish a 
volume callback, the client caches the version number for the volume. The server 
increments the volume version number whenever a file in that volume is 
updated. 
A run of this protocol concerns a file f, and optionally the version number v from 
volume V containing f. Before requesting v, the client must have at least one file in 
V in its cache, and all cached files in Y must be valid. This requirement ensures the 
files at C correspond to the version number it receives. 
A client may validate v just as it would a file. If it has both file and volume state 
at the beginning of a run, it may validate them in either order. If a client validates 
v successfully, it receives a callback for the volume. No further communication is 
necessary to read any file in the volume until the callback is broken or a failure 
occurs. 
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Thus, Coda+ is complicated by the addition of a new type of cached data, called 
a volume. This addition leads to a richer state space, more state transitions, and more 
cases in which failures can arise. For example, whereas AFS-2 has only five classes of 
runs, the Coda+ protocol has fifteen. Though one could argue that analyzing AFS-1 
and AFS-2 using mechanical tools like model checkers is overkill, Coda+ is large 
enough to warrant validation beyond pencil-and-paper analysis. 
4.3.1. State machine model 
For the Coda+ model, we consider one server, two identical clients, one file, and 
one volume version number. To model failures, we also use an environment module 
that is identical to that of AFS-2. 
The server now has four beliefs, two for the files cached by the clients and two for 
their cached version numbers. These beliefs can take the values valid and nocall. 
The server does not have an explicit invalid belief. 
Each of the clients has two beliefs. One belief is about the validity of the file and 
ranges over {valid, suspect, nof ile}. The other belief is about the validity of the 
volume version number and ranges over {valid, suspect, nonumber}. The belief 
nonumber indicates that there is no volume version number in cache. 
The messages sent to the server by the clients range over {Ffetch, Fvalidate, 
Fupdate, Vfetch, Vvalidate, Vupdate}. The messages that the server sends to 
the clients range over {Fval, Finval, Vval, Vinval}. Messages starting with a V 
(F) relate to the version numbers (files). 
Figs. 9 and 10 give the state transition diagrams for a Coda+ client and server. Each 
node is labeled by the value of the belief about the file and the value of the belief 
about the volume version number. Each arc is labeled by the name of the message 
received by the client (server). 
4.3.2. SMV input and output for Coda+ 
We omit the actual SMV input and output for Coda+ since they are similar to 
that for AFS-1 and AFS-2 (see [42] for details). The property we check is the same 
cache coherence property, CC’, as that checked for AFS-2 (since we need to take into 
account transmission delay for Coda+ too). 
SMV’s output for Coda+ indicates that the cache coherence invariant (CC’) is true. 
SMV takes less than one second to check 43 684 reachable states. 
5. Discussion: different kinds of abstractions 
What made it possible for us to use model checking in our case study is that we 
chose different abstraction mappings to apply to the real system. We certainly did not 
check the actual C code that implements AFS-1, AFS-2, or Coda+, but then the level 
at which we would want to verify a protocol like cache coherence is much higher than 
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Client 
Fig. 9. State transition diagram for Coda+ client. 
Server 
Vvalidate & !validFT 
Vvalidate 84 
!validFV 
* : Vvalidate& 
validFV 
Vfetch 
Fig. 10. State transition diagram for Coda+ server. 
the code level; if the design is incorrect or incomplete (misses some cases) then the 
code is apt to reflect those mistakes and omissions. Designs, especially for distributed 
systems protocols, are thus good subjects for model checking. 
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In this section we explain in more detail some of the abstraction mappings that we 
applied, which can be used more generally in other settings. We exploit (1) the form of 
the property, 4 to be satisfied, (2) domain-specific knowledge, and (3) problem-specific 
knowledge. 
5.1. Exploiting the form of I$ 
In a real instance of a distributed file system like Andrew or Coda, there are an 
unbounded number of files, clients, and servers. To analyze the state space of a real 
instance would be beyond the capability of any model checker today. 
If $J is in the form of \dx.P(x) then if for any instance, a, proving P(a) will let us 
deduce 4 by the generalization rule from logic: 
P(a) 
Vx.P(x) 
Our cache coherence invariant (CC) is stated as “for all clients, for all servers, 
for all files . . ..” Thus, for example, for AFS-1, we simply successively apply the 
generalization rule three times upon proving the property for a model with just one 
client, one server, and one file. 
Roscoe and MacCarthy make a similar point in their work using FDR to model check 
data-independent properties of concurrent processes [36]; Wolper provides a formal 
justification for data-independence [43]. Dams et al. [ 151 use the idea of exploiting 
the form of 4 in extending abstract interpretation to nondeterministic systems; they 
consider two different subsets of CTL*, universal CTL* and existential CTL*, where 
path quantifiers are restricted to be only of one kind (universal or existential). 
5.2. Exploiting domain-specific knowledge 
In our domain of distributed systems, we need to worry about failures and transmis- 
sion delays. First, we abstract from different types of failures like crashed nodes and 
downed communication links since our protocols act the same regardless of the type 
of failure. We do, however, need to model that a failure may occur; we use an envi- 
ronment machine (env) to model this possibility. We also need to model that clients 
and servers can detect a failure; we use the failure1 and f ailure2 parameters for 
this purpose. 
Second, transmission delay in conjunction with failures complicate reasoning about 
correctness in distributed systems. During the interval in which a message is traveling, 
the sender may have made some state change which will render the correctness condi- 
tion false until the receiver processes the message and changes its state. Transmission 
delay is loosely bounded by the timeout period used by the underlying communication 
protocol, denoted by ,8. It also takes time for clients and servers to detect failures. The 
interval between the occurrence of a failure and its detection, denoted by r, defines 
a window of vulnerability. To bound the failure detection interval, clients and servers 
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probe each other periodically, and declare failures if messages time out. Let p be the 
probe interval and assume that clients and servers use the same probe interval, but do 
not necessarily probe each other at the same time. Then the failure detection interval 
is at most r = p + p. In Coda r is composed of a probe interval of 10min and a 
message timeout of 15 s. 
We abstract from the exact times that contribute to r and model this interval as a 
single step in a state machine. This interpretation lets us characterize the correctness 
condition, CC’, in terms of the next-state temporal logic operator (AX) rather than the 
original, simpler CC. If transmission were instantaneous and there were no failures, 
there would be no need for modeling r since client and server beliefs could be updated 
simultaneously. 
In effect, r lets us represent transmission delay inherent in any distributed system. 
We represent r by a single step transition in SMV since we can view this time delay 
as another kind of state transition effected by the environment. We did not model this 
environment’s effect explicitly, as we did failures, but rather implicitly by exploiting 
SMV’s model of synchronous state machines (and the implicit presence of a global 
clock). Thus the passage of time in SMV corresponds to the passage of time needed 
in the protocol. Only a single step is needed since we assume clients and servers will 
detect failures within z in which case the run of the protocol ends. 
Pong and Dubois [35] exploit knowledge of their domain in choosing abstractions 
for verifying cache coherence protocols for shared memory multiprocessor systems (a 
different domain from ours since we have a different model of communication and we 
need to deal with faults). They observe that correctness of a cache coherence protocol 
for those systems is not dependent on the exact number of cached copies, which in 
general could be unbounded. Rather, states need to keep track of whether the caches 
have 0, 1, or multiple copies, thereby reducing the possibilities to just three from an 
unbounded number. Pong and Dubois devise a symbolic state expansion procedure 
that intimately relies on this insight. 
5.3. Exploiting problem-specijic knowledge 
We use 4 to drive the choice of “appropriate” abstractions. For example, if 4 is a 
property about an integer, x, we may care only that x is negative, positive, or zero. We 
can define an abstraction function that maps an infinite set of values to three values. 
Or, if $J is a property about an integer set, s, we may care only about whether the set 
is empty or not; we may not care at all about what its elements are. We can define 
an abstraction function that maps an infinite set of set values to two values. 
In our problem of cache coherence between clients and servers, the property 4 that 
we want to verify is that the client’s beliefs about the validity of cached files are 
consistent with a server’s beliefs. We let #J guide us in determining what details of the 
real system we can safely ignore. 
First, we abstract from the clients’ caches, i.e., sets of files and volume version 
numbers. Since we have simplified our model to handle just one file, we need only 
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model whether the cache, C, is empty or not. In the case of AFS-1 and AFS-2, C = 
0 or C = {f}; for Coda+, C can additionally be {f,u}. This abstraction gives us 
two (or three) cases to consider instead of an exponential number of cases (2”) for an 
unbounded number, n, of files and volumes. Note also that we never have to consider 
the case of the cache value, {u}, since the protocol prohibits a volume version number 
from being cached if a file is not also cached. 
Second, we need only represent the belief a client has about the cached file. We 
do not need to model sets of beliefs (given we have only one file or one volume 
version number about which to have a belief). For example, for AFS-2, in reality, 
we might have a cache, C, and a belief set B (for file f), that ranges over 8 and 
{valid(f)}. Combined with the abstraction above, where we consider a simplification 
of the cache, rather than two state variables, we need only one (belief ), and rather 
than four possibilities (2 x 2), we need represent only three. We define a (partial) 
abstraction function, A, that maps a pair (C, B) to a belief in {valid, nofile,suspect}: 
( {f},{uaZid(f)} ) H valid 
; ~;;;i;cr)~ ) H I(unreachable case) 
(0,s; 
H suspect 
H nof ile 
For Coda+, we apply a similar abstraction for beliefs about the volume version number 
since it also can take only three possible values, valid, suspect, nonumber. Also, 
for Coda+ we do not need to consider all nine possible combinations of beliefs for the 
file and volume version number since two of them are impossible, again knowing that 
a volume version number is cached if and only if a file (in that volume) is cached. 
(To be pedantic, in Fig. 9, only seven possible combinations of the values for the file 
and volume version numbers appear in the nodes.) 
Third, we do not even need to model the file itself since we do not care at all about 
the contents (value) of the file. We would if we needed to compare the values of two 
different files or extract information about the file based on its value. Thus, we identify 
the transmission of the file with the transmission of the message about the file; for 
example, in AFS-2, the val message can be thought of as abstractly containing the 
file itself as well as the status about its validity. 
Fourth, we abstract from the type of data cached. In the AFS protocols, the types 
include files and directories. For our analysis, however, that there are different types 
of data is completely irrelevant to the correctness of the protocol. We use the generic 
term “file” to stand for any kind of data. However, in Coda+, a third type, volumes, 
is treated differently, and thus must be modeled explicitly; as mentioned earlier, it is 
this new data type that complicates the Coda protocol. 
Fifth, we abstract from the notion of validity, which in practice is determined by the 
recency of a file. Suppose as in the implementation, recency is determined by compar- 
ing the totally ordered timestamps associated with files. For any pair of timestamped 
files, fti and ftz, we can determine whether one is more recent by comparing their 
timestamps, tl < t2; but since this always returns true or false, we can model recency, 
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and hence validity, as a boolean variable representing whether a file is valid or not. 
This abstraction appears explicitly in the way we use the valid-file boolean variable 
in the server module, letting the server nondeterministically choose between the two 
possibilities. 
Finally, we abstract from individual runs of protocol. We consider classes of runs, 
categorized by a protocol’s sets of initial and final states. For Coda+, this reduces the 
number of cases to consider from forty-four to fifteen (corresponding to the fifteen 
paths in the client state transition diagram of Fig. 9) [34]. 
6. Related work 
Model checking originated with Clarke and Emerson’s work in 1981 [9]. As men- 
tioned in the introduction, it has already proven to be extremely successful in de- 
bugging hardware [5,16,32,11, 10,4]. Tool support for model checking includes SMV 
[31], FDR [19], COSPAN [22], the Concurrency Workbench [ 121, Mu@ [17], and Met 
[2]. There are more and more documented case studies; for example, the proceedings 
of the 1995 Workshop of Industrial-Strength Formal Techniques contains four model 
checking case study papers [20]. 
We are not the first to explore the use of model checking in the software domain. 
Three other approaches complement ours and each other. Since they are all recent 
(dated 1993-94), we expect that over time results from one approach will carry over 
to the others. 
l Atlee and Gammon follow a specification-language based approach [3]. They 
verify safety properties for event-driven systems described by the SCR tabular re- 
quirements language. Their case studies include an automobile cruise control system 
and a water-level monitoring system. They show how to represent any specification 
written in a subset of SCR as a finite state machine. They use an extended version 
of SMV for their model checker. 
l Jackson explores the richness of types in software systems. State variables for hard- 
ware (and SCR) are of simple types like boolean, but in software they range over 
more complex type like sets, graphs, and relations. He exploits symmetry in mathe- 
matical relations to reduce the state space; he shows how to model check Z speci- 
fications [26], which is essentially based on his relational calculus. His Nitpick tool 
implements his model enumeration method [27]. 
l Allen and Garlan’s use of model checking focuses at the level of software architec- 
ture, a level of abstraction far above the real system, but again where many design 
flaws can be detected. They use FDR to detect deadlocks in software architectures 
described in the Wright architectural description language [l]. Wright is based on a 
subset of CSP, and thus it leaves states completely uninterpreted. 
Our approach complements all three of the above since in each case, the researchers 
first build some finite model of the real system and express it in terms of SCR, Z, 
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or Wright. In doing so, they implicitly apply the kinds of abstractions we used in 
our examples. By restricting themselves to a specific language, they have the advan- 
tage of avoiding having to define different abstractions per problem, since they do this 
mapping once and for all. In our approach, we let $J drive the choice of abstractions 
and simply express our models directly in terms of SMV input. We have the advan- 
tages of bypassing the “intermediate” specification language translation step, and of not 
being restricted to the domain of systems that a given specification language is most 
suited for describing. Thus, our focus is on finding “appropriate” abstractions that work 
across different domains and different problems, not on checking models expressed in 
a particular specification language. 
Cheung and Kramer’s two-step analysis approach applied to reasoning about large- 
scale distributed systems is similar in spirit to ours [S]. They use dataflow analysis 
as a way to approximate a system’s behavior and then contextual analysis to do an 
exhaustive search of the resulting state space. 
Approaches to combine model checking with theorem proving include work by Hun- 
gar [25] and Kurshan and Lamport [28], and in tools such as the Stanford Temporal 
Prover (STeP) [30] and SRI’s PVS [40] ‘. Relevant to our approach of using ab- 
straction mappings, Havelund and Shankar used PVS to justify formally an abstraction 
mapping they use in a case study on a bounded retransmission protocol [23]; the point 
behind their case study was to compare the performance of Dill’s model checker Mur4 
[ 171, SMV, and the PVS model checker on a finite abstraction of the protocol. 
Finally, we could have used other, more general, proof-based approaches such as 
Unity [7] or I/O automata [29], than the Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic of Authen- 
tication, to reason about our protocol examples; however, the particular proof system 
in which we do our reasoning is secondary to the main point of this paper. Rather, 
we show that we can take a finite state model such as that which was already de- 
veloped (using the BAN logic) in Mummer-t et al. [34] and “feed it” into an existing 
model checker. More importantly, the point of this paper is to encourage the software 
engineering community to consider seriously model checking technology and tools for 
reasoning about software systems. 
7. Conclusions and future directions 
Model checking has the significant advantage over more traditional forms of soft- 
ware verification in that much of the hard work is done automatically by the machine. 
Moreover, both the inputs and the results of model checking tools are straightforward 
to understand by non-experts: since a model checker’s interface is well-defined and 
it is straightforward to provide its expected inputs, we can readily use it as a “black 
box.” This suggests that for gaining assurance about software, model checking can 
* April 1995 version. 
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become a technology that is much more broadly accessible to practitioners than other 
techniques. 
The choice of what abstractions to apply takes some good judgment. After all, we 
could define a model of a system that is so abstract that any property would be 
trivially satisfied or that would allow any possible concrete realization. Further research 
is needed to characterize more formally what makes an abstraction “good.” 
Another direction of further research is to devise ways to justify abstractions for- 
mally. Ideally, a property shown to be true of a finite abstraction of a system should 
be true of the original system. One way to justify an abstraction formally is to restrict 
the specification language, e.g., the approach taken by Dams et al. [15]. Another way 
is to prove that an abstraction preserves the correctness properties of interest, which is 
what Havelund and Shankar do using PVS, a theorem prover, in their bounded retrans- 
mission protocol example. Ironically, theorem proving is still required; the expectation 
is that the theorem to be proved is “smaller” than that corresponding to proving the 
property of the original system. 
To make our reasoning more precise, we need to justify the abstractions we chose 
in this case study; however, as stated in the introduction, the goal of our work is 
to demonstrate to builders of large software systems that “approximate” reasoning by 
use of model checking is a low-cost, yet highly effective way of debugging system 
designs. Our choice of abstractions were guided entirely by either our own intuition 
or that of the original file system designers and implementers. Even based on this 
imprecise method of choosing abstractions, software engineers can use our approach to 
gain greater confidence in and a better understanding of their systems. More research 
needs to be done in developing methods and tools to enable more precise reasoning, 
while maintaining a low-cost to using them. 
We lack a formal justification of our abstractions. To give one requires a formal 
model of the original protocols; this does not exist. The protocols as presented in 
the literature are either given a one-paragraph textual description or a lengthy textual 
description that reveals implementation details (like the fields in the C structs) that 
completely obscure how the protocol works. Indeed the first formalization of these 
protocols is given in the paper of Mummert et al. [34], which we have reproduced in 
part in Section 3.1. This formalization is also an abstraction of the real system. 
In our own work, toward making progress both in demonstrating feasibility and in 
understanding characteristics of good abstractions, we plan to push on more examples. 
We have recently applied the approach described in this paper to validate recovery pro- 
tocols [ 131 for redundant disk arrays, in particular for the RAID Level-5 architecture. 
We are just beginning to work on protocols proposed and in use for electronic com- 
merce. Our primary goal is to provide more convincing evidence to systems designers 
and builders that formal reasoning tools are ready for day-to-day use. As a useful by- 
product, we expect to identify other kinds of abstractions appropriate to apply to real 
software systems. 
We are optimistic about the future of the use of automated tools like model checkers 
to reason about software systems. One way to measure the practicality of such tools is 
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by how easy they are to teach and learn. The second author did the model checking 
case study in this paper as part of her senior honor’s thesis. In CMU’s Master’s of 
Software Engineering core course on Analysis of Software Artifacts, we have students 
do a series of three two-week projects using SMV, Nitpick, and FDR; students in the 
MSE course on Architectures of Software Systems also use FDR to analyze Wright 
specifications. 
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